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Bloomberg
A Fractured World Ushers In the End of Dollar Dominance
BACK IN AUGUST, Bank of England Governor Mark Carney gave a speech
in Jackson Hole, Wyo., about the problem of the U.S. dollar. The issue, as he identified it, was not that the dollar’s fundamentals are weak, but that they’re too strong. Even as the U.S.’s share
of worldwide gross domestic product steadily shrinks, the dollar’s share of global transactions has only grown. This mismatch proves dangerous when, in the process of fulfilling its domestic mandate, the Federal Reserve makes moves that have huge ripple effects around the world.
Why is the dollar so popular?
For years people have been crying about how U.S. policymakers have abused its strength and unique global position.
They point to the burgeoning Fed balance sheet, the massive national debt, or the huge trade deficit that the U.S. has run with the rest of the world. But the simple fact is that people use the dollar because other people use the dollar. As fund manager Eric Lonergan has argued,
a currency is like a social network or a language. People learn English because other people speak English. People use Facebook because their friends and family use Facebook. And if you’re doing business around the world, there’s a good chance you’re using dollars because that’s what other people are using.
Of course, nobody has to do any of these things. There are movements made up of people who proudly reject linguistic monoculture, who focus their efforts on preserving endangered languages rather than accepting the dollar as the world’s reserve currency of choice and of the Federal Reserve as the globe’s most powerful central bank. If the world has been clamoring for anything—other than a cure—it’s been dollars. And the Fed has been handing out plenty, reinforcing its standing as the de facto guardian of both its own currency and the functioning of global financial markets.
The second reason: the persistent absence of an alternative. For years pundits have predicted the rise of
a challenger to dollar supremacy. Those forecasts came with the launch of the euro in 1999 and with the global financial crisis a decade later. They accompanied the 2016 inclusion of China’s renminbi
in the basket that makes up the International Monetary Fund’s own
de facto currency, its special
drawing rights. Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies have even laid a claim. None, though, has ever truly taken off. The dollar has, at the very least, maintained its place.
It’s evident in what central banks around the world have chosen to hold as reserves. More than $6.7 trillion, or 60%, of nations’ collective $11 trillion in sovereign foreign exchange reserves were parked in dollars at the end of last year, according to data from the IMF. China’s RMB, by contrast, accounted for $217.7 billion, or just under 2%.
Is some bigger trend afoot that could change that? A rewiring of globalization that might reduce demand for dollars, perhaps? The argument is that the crisis has triggered an existential unease about sprawling supply chains, particularly when it comes to medical supplies, and that now
a great manufacturing homecoming
is likely. But that discomfort has been focused primarily on authoritarian China’s growing place in the global economy. Even if U.S. or European companies were willing to give up on the enormous Chinese domestic market,
it’s hard to see how a move toward more diversified supply chains undermines the dollar’s standing, even if it leads to less commerce. It certainly wouldn’t strengthen the case for the renminbi.
The argument also represents a common misdiagnosis of a longer-term trend that may indeed accelerate with the current crisis, but in far subtler ways than even the economic nationalist now in the White House might want.
Peak globalization has been falsely diagnosed many times over the past decade. A move toward shortening global supply chains has been under way since at least 2011, when the tsunami in
Japan and floods in Thailand put a new premium on managing risks to production and diversifying suppliers. The “China 1” sourcing strategy adopted by many non-Chinese companies accelerated during the recent trade wars. Those trends—and even
a rebirth of American protectionism— have proven how enduring globalization has become. Factories left China, but they moved to such places as Vietnam or Mexico rather than “reshoring” to America’s industrial heartland.
EVEN IF ALL medical products such
as respirators and medicines were made in the U.S. it would represent a small share of world commerce. Global trade in medical products was worth roughly
$2 trillion in 2019, about 5% of the total, according to the World Trade Organization. America’s imports represented less than $200 billion of that. By comparison, when the Bank for International Settlements last measured the daily turnover in global foreign exchange markets last April, it put it at more than $6.6 trillion in transactions, $5.8 trillion of which involved the
U.S. dollar.
There’s a reason that America doesn’t do fear, at least not when it comes to the dollar. Even in a crisis,
its place is just too big for anybody to mess with.
Bloomberg
A Fractured World Ushers In the End of Dollar Dominance【一个破碎的世界迎来了美元霸权的终结】
BACK IN AUGUST, Bank of England Governor Mark Carney gave a speech
in Jackson Hole, Wyo., about the problem of the U.S. dollar. The issue（主）, as he identified【识别；指出】it, was（谓）not that the dollar’s fundamentals【基础】 are weak, but that they’re too strong. Even as the U.S.’s share of worldwide gross domestic product【GDP国内生产总值】 steadily shrinks（缩水）【decline；decrease；drop；dip】, the dollar’s share of global transactions【全球交易】has only【竟然】grown. This mismatch【不匹配】 proves dangerous【prove adj{用主动} 被证明是危险的】when, in the process of fulfilling its domestic mandate【履行其国内任务】, the Federal Reserve【联邦储备委员会】makes moves that have huge ripple effects【涟漪效应】around the world.
Why is the dollar so popular?
For years people have been crying【抱怨】about how U.S. policymakers【决策者】have abused【滥用】its strength and unique global position【实力和独特的全球地位】.
They point to the burgeoning【激增的； 迅速发展的】Fed balance sheet【美联储资产负债表】, the massive national debt【巨额国债】,or the huge trade deficit【巨大的贸易赤字】that the U.S. has run with the rest of the world. But the simple fact is that people use the dollar because other people use the dollar. As fund manager【基金经理】Eric Lonergan has argued, a currency【货币】is like a social network【社交网络】or a language. People learn English because other people speak English. People use Facebook because their friends and family use Facebook. And if you’re doing business around the world, there’s a good chance you’re using dollars because that’s what other people are using.
Of course, nobody has to do any of these things. There are movements made up of people【由人组成的】 who proudly reject linguistic monoculture【拒绝语言单一文化；mono-单一的】, who focus their efforts on preserving endangered languages【保护濒危语言】rather than【而不是】accepting the dollar as the world’s reserve currency【世界储备货币】of choice and of the Federal Reserve as the globe’s most powerful central bank【全球最强大的央行】. If the world has been clamoring【吵吵嚷嚷要；叫嚣着】for anything—other than a cure—it’s been dollars. And the Fed【美联储】has been handing out plenty【出台大量的（政策）】,reinforcing its standing【加强它的地位】as the defacto guardian【实际的维护者】 of both its own currency and the functioning of global financial markets【全球金融市场的运作】.
The second reason: the persistent absence【持续的缺席】of an alternative【替代品】. For years pundits【专家们】have predicted the rise of a challenger to dollar supremacy【美元霸权：dollar dominance】. Those forecasts【预测】came with the launch of the euro【随着欧元的推出】in 1999 and with the global financial crisis a decade later. They accompanied【伴随着】the 2016 inclusion of China’s renminbi in the basket【2016年将中国人民币纳入一揽子计划】that makes up the International Monetary Fund’s own defacto currency, its special drawing rights【特别提款权】. Bitcoin【比特币】 and other cryptocurrencies【加密货币】 have even laid a claim. None, though, has ever truly taken off【成功】. The dollar has, at the very least, maintained its place.
It’s evident in what central banks【央行】around the world have chosen to hold as reserves【储备】. More than $6.7 trillion【万亿】, or 60%, of nations’ collective $11 trillion in sovereign foreign exchange reserves【在主权外汇储备中】were parked in dollars at the end of last year, according to data from the IMF. China’s RMB, by contrast, accounted for【占据】$217.7 billion, or just under 2%.
Is some bigger trend afoot【更大的趋势正在进行中】that could change that? A rewiring of globalization【全球化的重新布线】that might reduce demand for dollars, perhaps? The argument is that the crisis has triggered【触发】an existential unease【现存的不安】 about sprawling supply chains【扩张的供应链】, particularly when it comes to【当提到】 medical supplies, and that now a great manufacturing homecoming【制造业回流】is likely. But that discomfort has been focused primarily on authoritarian China’s growing place in the global economy. Even if U.S. or European companies were willing to give up on the enormous Chinese domestic market,
it’s hard to see how a move toward more diversified supply chains undermines the dollar’s standing, even if it leads to less commerce. It certainly wouldn’t strengthen the case for the renminbi.
The argument also represents a common misdiagnosis of a longer-term trend that may indeed accelerate with the current crisis, but in far subtler ways than even the economic nationalist now in the White House might want.
Peak globalization has been falsely diagnosed many times over the past decade. A move toward shortening global supply chains has been under way since at least 2011, when the tsunami in
Japan and floods in Thailand put a new premium on managing risks to production and diversifying suppliers. The “China 1” sourcing strategy adopted by many non-Chinese companies accelerated during the recent trade wars. Those trends—and even
a rebirth of American protectionism— have proven how enduring globalization has become. Factories left China, but they moved to such places as Vietnam or Mexico rather than “reshoring” to America’s industrial heartland.
EVEN IF ALL medical products such
as respirators and medicines were made in the U.S. it would represent a small share of world commerce. Global trade in medical products was worth roughly
$2 trillion in 2019, about 5% of the total, according to the World Trade Organization. America’s imports represented less than $200 billion of that. By comparison, when the Bank for International Settlements last measured the daily turnover in global foreign exchange markets last April, it put it at more than $6.6 trillion in transactions, $5.8 trillion of which involved the
U.S. dollar.
There’s a reason that America doesn’t do fear, at least not when it comes to the dollar. Even in a crisis,
its place is just too big for anybody to mess with.
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